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Though in many natural objects, whiteness refiningly enhances
beauty, as if imparting some special virtue of its own, as in
marbles, japonicas, and pearls; and though various nations have in
some way recognised a certain royal pre-eminence in this hue; even
the barbaric, grand old kings of Pegu placing the title 'Lord of the
White Elephant' above all their other magniloquent descriptions of
dominion; and the modem kings of Siam unfurling the same snow-
white quadruped in the royal standard; and the Hanoverian flag
bearing the one figure of a snow-white charger; and the great
Austrian Empire, Caesarian heir to the overlording Rome, having
for the imperial color the same imperial hue; and though this pre-
eminence in it applies to the human race itself, giving the white
man ideal mastership over every dusky tribe; and though, besides
all this, whiteness has been even made significant of gladness, for
among the Romans a white stone marked a joyful day; and though
in other mortal sympathies and symbolisings, this same hue is made
the emblem of many touching, noble things-the innocence of
brides, the benignity of age; though among the Red Men of
America the giving of the white belt of wampum was the deepest
pledge of honor; though in many climes, whiteness typifies the
majesty of Justice in the ermine of the Judge, and contributes to the
daily state of kings and queens drawn by milk-white steeds; though
even in the higher mysteries of the most august religions it has been
made the symbol of the divine spotlessness and power; by the
Persian fire-worshippers, the white forked flame being held the
holiest on the altar; and in the Greek mythologies, Great Jove
himself being made incarnate in a snow-white bull; and though to
the noble Iroquois, the mid-winter sacrifice of the sacred White
Dog was by far the holiest festival of their theology, that spotless,
faithful creature being held the purest envoy they could send to the
Great Spirit with the annual tithings of their own fidelity; and
though directly from the Latin word for white, all Christian priests
derive the name of one part of their sacred vesture, the alb or tunic,
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worn beneath the cassock; and though among the holy pomps of the
Romish faith, white is specially employed in the celebration of the
Passion of our Lord; though in the Vision of St. John, white robes
are given to the redeemed, and the four-and-twenty elders stand
clothed in white before the great white throne, and the Holy One
that sitteth there white like wool; yet for all these accumulated
associations, with whatever is sweet, and honorable, and sublime,
there yet lurks an elusive something in the innermost idea of this
hue, which strikes more of panic to the soul than that redness which
affrights in blood.
-Herman Melville, Moby-Dick
I. INTRODUCTION: THE ANTINOMY OF WHITENESS
The antinomy of whiteness has haunted our nation since its founding.
For much of American history, the concept of whiteness has embodied an
ostensibly august and pure tradition while simultaneously enforcing a
regime of fear and oppression. This internal contradiction is poignantly
unmasked in Herman Melville's 459-word sentence from Moby-Dick about
the color white and all of its accompanying honor and terror. Captain
Ahab's mad search for the great white whale matches the American
Republic's fruitless search for a concept of race2 around which it could
organize itself. Even today, the concept of race remains vital for an
understanding of our social structures. To almost all Americans, the word
"white" continues to connote race. The color has transcended its chromatic
meaning and woven itself into a web of social, political, and economic
entanglements that define our nation and its people, for better or worse.
Despite the importance of racial definitions to individual identities and
social structures, whiteness has remained an elusive and abstract concept.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, immigration
statutes forced the American legal system to confront the task of defining
what or who constituted the white race for the purposes of naturalization.
Shortly after the ratification of the Constitution, Congress limited
naturalization to "any alien, being a free white person, who shall have
resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for
the term of two years." 3 Following the Civil War, Congress responded to
the Dred Scott4 decision by extending the right of naturalization to "aliens
1. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK 234-36 (Constable & Co. 1922) (1850).
2. As noted infra Section lI.C, the conception of race was eventually problematized into a
hermeneutics of color.
3. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, repealed by Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, I Stat.
414.
4. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
[Vol. 109: 817
Performing Whiteness
of African nativity and to persons of African descent." 5 Until 1952,6 only
whites and blacks could qualify for naturalization." During the early years
of the Republic, no litigation resulted from these naturalization
requirements. At that time, the ethnic makeup of the country lent itself to a
strict division between white and black. However, as a new wave of
immigrants began to enter the country in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, the law was forced to deal with an influx of individuals who did
not fit so neatly into the constructed racial categories of the time. A wave of
litigation ensued over the naturalization law's racial prerequisite. Fifty-two
cases were reported between 1878 and 1952. In all of these cases, an
individual sued to be declared white by law after being denied citizenship
rights by immigration authorities on the grounds of racial ineligibility!
While litigation over whiteness often grew absurd, with judges delving
into the depths of antiquity, reconstructing history, and spouting rigid
ideologies in order to justify their rulings, the reification of whiteness had a
profound impact on shaping the immigrant experience in the United States.
Whiteness was transformed into a material concept imbued with rights and
privileges, such as the franchise, for those who conformed to its definition.'
As Cheryl Harris argues, "[I]n the early years of the country, it was not the
concept of race alone that operated to oppress Blacks and Indians; rather, it
was the interaction between conceptions of race and property that played a
critical role in establishing and maintaining racial and economic
subordination." " Similarly, for immigrants of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the critical interaction between racial classifications
and property played an instrumental part in the creation of socioeconomic
hierarchies. In California, for example, whiteness determined the ability of
immigrants to participate fully in the economy. The Alien Land Law,"
passed in 1920 and upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court in
5. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 7, 16 Stat. 254.
6. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 2, § 311, 66 Stat. 239 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1994)).
7. There was a brief and accidental exception to the rule from June 22, 1874 to February 18.
1875. See In re Ah Chong, 2 F. 733, 739 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880) (noting the inadvertent omission of
the word "white" from the naturalization statute that made nonwhite individuals eligible for
naturalization from June 22, 1874 to February 18, 1875).
8. Curiously enough, there is only one reported case of an individual suing for naturalization
eligibility on the grounds of being black by law. See In re Crnz, 23 F. Supp. 774 (E.D.N.Y. 1938).
9. Interestingly enough, a failure to assimilate or perform whiteness was also one of Chief
Justice Marshall's grounds for denying Native Americans the full right of property possession in
the Supreme Court's famous Johnson v. McIntosh decision. See Johnson v. McIntosh. 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 240,260 (1823) (describing Native Americans as a -people with whom it was impossible
to mix").
10. Cheryl L Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L REv. 1709, 1716 (1993).
11. Alien Property Initiative Act (Alien Land Law) of 1920, 1 Cal. Gen. Laws, Act 261
(Deering 1944 & Supp. 1949).
20001
The Yale Law Journal
1923,12 prohibited non-citizens from owning property in the state.
Furthermore, other regulations prevented non-naturalized immigrants from
exercising certain economic rights such as obtaining fishing 3 or law "
licenses.
An examination of the racial-prerequisite cases reveals the process of
litigating whiteness in action. Ian Fidencio Haney L6pez's acclaimed book,
White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race," covers some of this
ground. In his study, Haney L6pez analyzes the Supreme Court's rulings in
Ozawa v. United States16 and United States v. Thind 7 and the cases that led
up to the two decisions. Prior to the Supreme Court's rulings, Haney L6pez
observes, the lower courts wavered between two competing doctrines in
determining whiteness-the common-knowledge test and the scientific-
evidence inquiry. Ultimately, he argues that Ozawa and Thind marked the
victory of the common-knowledge test. 8 The Court acknowledged the
failure of the scientific model of racial determination and acceded to an
explicitly constructed notion of race. Thus, he concludes succinctly that
"[f]aw constructs race" :"9 Race is not merely a scientific reality but a social
construct, and the law emerges as one of the most potent forces in this
process of construction.20
In his analysis, Haney L6pez ignores the race prerequisite cases
occurring after the Supreme Court's rulings in Ozawa and Thind, arguing
that those fifteen cases "adduce little new in terms of racial rationales." 21
To him, these cases represent mere applications of the common-knowledge
principle to racial determination. However, there is much to be learned
from the application of precedent and from how courts chose to interpret
the rulings in Ozawa and Thind.
As this study will demonstrate, a close textual reading of Ozawa, Thind,
and their progeny reveals that the dominant criterion for the determination
of whiteness was not a scientific standard or even a common-knowledge
test, the application of which was quite problematic. Instead, whiteness was
determined through performance. The potential for immigrants to assimilate
within mainstream Anglo-American culture was put on trial. Successful
12. See Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); see also Morrison v. California. 291 U.S.
82 (1934); Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258 (1925); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923);
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
13. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
14. See United States v. Pandit, 15 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1926).
15. IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996).
16. 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
17. 261 U.S. 204 (1923).
18. See HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 15, at 7, 8.
19. Id. at 19.
20. See Frank H. Wu, From Black to White and Back Again, 3 ASIAN L.J. 185, 186 (1996)
(reviewing HANEY LOPEz, supra note 15).
21. HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 15, at 33.
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litigants demonstrated evidence of whiteness in their character, religious
practices and beliefs, class orientation, language, ability to intermarry, and a
host of other traits that had nothing to do with intrinsic racial grouping.
Thus, a dramaturgy of whiteness emerged, responsive to the interests
of society as defined by the class in power-an "evolutionary
functionalism" 22 whereby courts played an instrumental role in limiting
naturalization to those new immigrant groups whom judges saw as most fit
to carry on the tradition of the "White Republic." 3 The courts thereby sent
a clear message to immigrants: The rights enjoyed by white males could
only be obtained through assimilatory behavior. White privilege became a
quid pro quo for white performance.
Part II will examine the Ozawa and Thind rulings and demonstrate how
they failed to signal the triumph of a common-knowledge standard. Part LII
will then analyze the racial-prerequisite cases following Ozaiva and Thind.
As I will argue, the courts applied Ozawa and Thind by emphasizing the
primacy of a dramaturgy of whiteness. Thus, performance became the
dominant criterion for racial determination and the courts directly
influenced the construction of racial identity. Finally, Part IV will conclude
by examining the relevance of the racial-prerequisite cases to current
legislation in force in the United States. In particular, I will analyze the
continuing impact of racial-definition games on discrimination suits
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 19822' and on immigration and
naturalization laws today.
1[. THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS: OzAWiA, THIND, AND THE
QUEST FOR A CRITERION To DETERMINE RACE
Prior to 1922, two competing doctrines characterized the racial-
prerequisite cases: the common-knowledge test and the scientific-evidence
inquiry. According to Haney L6pez, the Supreme Court's decisions in
Ozawa (1922) and Thind (1923) represented the ultimate triumph of the
common-knowledge test in judicial racial determination. 5 As Haney L6pez
argues, the common-knowledge standard relied upon "popular, widely held
conceptions of race and racial divisions" based entirely on perceptions that
might or might not be grounded in physical appearance. 6 This
methodology contrasted sharply with the scientific-evidence test, previously
22. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 59 (1984).
23. See ALEXANDER SAXTON. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE REPUBHUC (1990).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1994).
25. See HANEY L6PE supra note 15, at 107.
26. Id. at 5.
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in vogue, which had relied upon "supposedly objective, technical and
specialized knowledge for racial determination." 7
In 1922, Takao Ozawa's petition for naturalization came before the
Supreme Court. The Court ruled that Ozawa, an individual of Japanese
ancestry, was not a white person and was therefore ineligible for
naturalization." In so ruling, the Court held that membership in the
Caucasian race was a necessary (though not sufficient) condition to meet
the common-knowledge definition of "white person." 29 Since Ozawa was
not Caucasian, he could not qualify for naturalization.
The following year, Thind forced the Supreme Court to clarify which
Caucasians constituted "white persons." 30 In the case, Bhagat Singh
Thind, an immigrant of Asian Indian heritage, petitioned the Court
for naturalization rights. As Thind argued, Indians were classified by
anthropologists as Caucasians. Thus, he claimed to be white and eligible for
citizenship. The Supreme Court rejected his petition and elucidated the
position they had taken in Ozawa. The Court ruled that scientific evidence
would no longer be relevant to the racial-determination inquiry.' While a
scientific standard was consistent with the ruling in Ozawa (by mandating
Japanese exclusion from the concept of whiteness), such a test threatened to
produce a dangerous result in the Thind case, as scientific evidence
suggested that individuals with brown or even black skin color who were
anthropologically Caucasian would count as whites.32 Such an outcome
would have undermined and delegitimated the carefully constructed system
of racial hierarchy that dictated social relations in the United States. Thus,
the Thind Court abandoned the scientific-inquiry test and ruled that Indians
were not white. As the Court concluded, "It may be true that the blond
Scandinavian and the brown Hindu have a common ancestor in the dim
reaches of antiquity, but the average man knows perfectly well that there
are unmistakable and profound differences between them .... "
With these words, scholars such as Haney L6pez and Donald Braman
have concluded, Ozawa and Thind marked the victory of the common-
27. Id.
28. See Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922).
29. See id.
30. See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 206 (1923).
31. See id. at 208.
32. For the major scientific race treatises of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see
DANIEL GARRISON BRINTON, RACES AND PEOPLES (New York, N.D.C. Hodges 1890); Louis
FIGUIER, LES RACES HUMAINES (Paris, Hachette 1872); JOHN P. JEFFRIES, THE NATURAL
HISTORY OF THE HUMAN RACES (New York, E.O. Jenkins 1869); A.H. KEANE, THE WORLD'S
PEOPLES (1908); CHARLES PICKERING, THE RACES OF MAN (London, H.G. Bohn 1851); and
JAMES COWLES PRICHARD, THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MAN (London, H. Bailliere 1848). all of
which are cited in Dow v. United States, 226 F. 145, 146 (4th Cir. 1915).
33. Thind, 261 U.S. at 209.
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knowledge standard. 4 Viewed in isolation, they did. However, when
applied as precedent, they laid the groundwork for something much more
insidious-a system of racial determination not based on scientific evidence
or even on the common knowledge of an ordinary American, but a system
of white performance interpreted through the eyes of judges.35 Performance
of whiteness was evidenced in two ways. First, a petitioner could point to
his own adoption of white values and his personal dramaturgy of whiteness
as evidence of his appropriate racial categorization. Second, a petitioner
could point to the assimilation of his ethnic group into the core Western
European, Christian tradition as evidence of his whiteness.' Both methods
ultimately relied upon proof of "Anglo conformity,"" in the form of
educational attainment, occupational dispersal, language choice, residential
location, and intercultural marriage, 38 as a condition of citizenship. Thus,
Ozawa and Thind enabled judges to try the ability of individuals to adopt
white values and of ethnic groups to assimilate themselves into the White
Republic.39
34. See HANEY L6PEz, supra note 15, at 107; Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1375, 1410 (1999). Braman, for example, argues that Ozawa and Thind
provide extended examples of the Court's taking note of the scientific community's
failure to arrive at a practicable system of racial classification, and turning to a reliance
on the statutory meanings developed through the political process. The terms produced
were popular and not scientific, indicating and naturalizing an understanding of social
groups, not biological ones.
Braman, supra, at 1410.
35. This study draws upon Ariela Gross's work, which suggests that juries used performative
aspects of whiteness to make racial determinations in slavery trials in the antebellum South. See
Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century
South, 108 YME LJ. 109, 117, 156-76 (1998). However, Gross implies that the appellate process
was more immune to the use of such performative criteria (offered in the form of reputation
evidence). See id at 146. Furthermore, she points out that individual appellate judges were
actually conscious of the "subversive possibilities of a discourse of racial performance." Id. at
162. In focusing on bench rulings at both the trial and appellate levels, this article suggests that
judges were no more immune to the use of such performative criteria than were juries. Moreover.
the naturalization cases demonstrate that judges often lacked awareness of the subversive
possibilities of a discourse on racial performance, as in the case of Ozawa. Finally, a close textual
analysis of the naturalization cases unveils the more insidious assimilationist policy considerations
that factored into the judges' decisions-a powerful reflection of the broader goals of American
immigration policy.
36. Interestingly, the Court doth protest too much when it quickly disclaims its assimilationist
criteria as completely free of value judgments on racial worth: - It is very far from our thought to
suggest the slightest question of racial superiority or inferiority. What we suggest is merely racial
difference, and it is of such character and extent that the great body of our people instinctively
recognize it and reject the thought of assimilation." 77tind, 261 U.S. at 215. The word choice in
these sentences-from "very far" to "slightest" and ' merely" -belies the Court's underlying
motives.
37. Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: 77te Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L.
REV. 303, 312 (1986).
38. Seeid. at311-15.
39. Cf Enid Trucios-Gaynes, The Legacy of Racially Restrictive Immigration Lmvs and
Policies and the Construction of the American National Identity, 76 OR. L REv. 369, 371-72,
405-06 (1997) (demonstrating the power of assimilationist criteria in shaping immigration laws
and policies throughout American history).
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A. Not-So-Common Knowledge
To begin with, the common-knowledge standard enunciated in Ozawa
and Thind was quite difficult to apply, as courts did not give clear guidance
on what constituted evidence of common knowledge. Both Supreme Court
cases suggest that it is necessary to hark back to what the authors of the
1790 naturalization statute intended when they used the term "white
person." In Ozawa, the Court sought to ascertain how the statute's framers
would have ruled had the racial-determination issue been presented to
them.n" Similarly, the Thind Court held that "the words of the
[naturalization] statute are to be interpreted in accordance with the
understanding of the common man from whose vocabulary they were
taken."'" Thus, the Court read the statute as "written in the words of
common speech, for common understanding, by unscientific men." 42 This
attempt to uncover the intentions of the framers of the 1790 Naturalization
Act had a lasting impact. Even in one of the final racial-prerequisite cases,
In re Hassan, a Michigan federal district court noted that the
question which the court must answer is whether the members of
the group as a whole are white persons as Congress understood the
term in 1790 when it first enacted the statute. In deciding this latter
question, the test is not how the group in question would be
classified by ethnologists who have made a study of racial origins,
but, rather, what groups of peoples then living in 1790 with
characteristics then existing were intended by Congress to be
classified as "white persons." 4"
In this form, the common-knowledge test led to absurd results and flew
in the face of reality, leading a number of judges to demonstrate a selective
historical consciousness. For example, the Thind Court admitted that, in
1790,
[t]he immigration of that day was almost exclusively from the
British Isles and Northwestern Europe, whence they and their
forebears had come. When they extended the privilege of American
citizenship to "any alien, being a free white person," it was these
immigrants... and their kind whom they must have had
affirmatively in mind."4
40. See Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 195-96 (1922).
41. Thind, 261 U.S. at 209 (citation omitted).
42. Id. at 210.
43. In re Hassan, 48 F. Supp. 843, 846 (E.D. Mich. 1942).
44. Thind, 261 U.S. at 213.
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Nevertheless, the Court took a conveniently inclusive view of racial
categories by contending that Americans in the 1790s considered Southern
Europeans to be white on an equal footing with those of Anglo-Saxon
descent. As Justice Sutherland argued for the Court,
The succeeding years brought immigrants from Eastern, Southern
and Middle Europe, among them the Slavs and the dark-eyed,
swarthy people of Alpine and Mediterranean stock, and these were
received as unquestionably akin to those already here and readily
amalgamated with them. It was the descendants of these, and other
immigrants of like origin, who constituted the white population of
the country when § 2169, reenacting the naturalization test of 1790,
was adopted; and there is no reason to doubt, with like intent and
meaning."a
In reality, however, many individuals of European descent were
not readily integrated into mainstream American society. If anything,
they found themselves caught on the dark side of the white/black
binary. The Irish, for example, endured heavy prejudice in the
United States,' and, for years, they were considered the blacks of Europe
4 7
Similarly, Italians," Greeks, 49 and Slavs ° suffered from low social
45. Id. at 213-14 (emphasis added).
46. For a thorough historical account of the Irish-American struggle for integration into the
White Republic, see NOEL IGNATIEV, How THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995).
47. Sufficiently removed from historical memory, the statement has now become the stuff of
safe, mainstream ethnic humor. See, e.g., THE COMMITMENTS (Beacon Communications 1991)
(featuring a quip by the main character, an Irish musician named Jimmy. who states that " [tlhe
Irish are the blacks of Europe. Dubliners are the blacks of Ireland. North Dubliners are the blacks
of Dublin.").
48. As Leonard Dinnerstein and David Reimers observe,
Italians... were one of the most despised groups. Old-stock Americans called them
wops, dagos, and guineas and referred to them as the "Chinese of Europe" and "just as
bad as the Negroes." In the South some Italians were forced to attend all-black schools.
and in both the North and the South they were victimized by brutality. In 1875, the Ntnv
York Tunes thought it "perhaps hopeless to think of civilizing them, or keeping them in
order, except by the arm of the law."
LEONARD DINNERSTEIN & DAVID M. REIMERS. ETHNIC AMERICANS: A HISTORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND ASSIMILATION 36 (1982). quoted in MARY C. WATERS, ETHNIc OPTIONS:
CHOOSING IDENTITIES IN AMERICA 2 (1990).
49. Americans of Northern European descent commonly viewed Greeks as "sone kind of
lower species," physically attacking them in Omaha. Nebraska. and forcing them out of Mountain
View, Idaho, for example. Id.
50. "The Slavs," argued one turn-of-the-century physician. "are immune to certain kinds of
dirt. They can stand what would kill a white man." EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS, THE OLD WORLD
IN THE NEw 291 (1914), quoted in WATERS. supra note 48, at 2 (emphasis added). This statement
typifies the attitude towards Slavs at the time. The etymological link between "Slav" and
." slave" -a link which removed Slavs from the concept of whiteness and its concomitant virtue of
freedom and relegated them to the realm of blackness and its natural consequence of servitude-
also symbolizes the subordinate standing of those of Slavic descent. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEV
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1107 (1985) (linking both the word "Slav" and "slave" to the
Medieval Latin word "sclavus").
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status, 51 and their racial status was a matter of great controversy that
remained unresolved for years.52 All told, Justice Sutherland's revisionist
contention that Southern Europeans were readily amalgamated into the
white race revealed a poor sense of historical awareness. A true return to
the intent of the 1790 authors of the naturalization statute would have
required a cessation of citizenship rights to immigrants of Slavic,
Mediterranean, and even Irish descent. As an earlier court had argued in
another racial-prerequisite case, United States v. Balsara,53 any attempt to
apply the naturalization law through the intent of the 1790 framers of the
statute was farcical:
The government contends that the words must be construed to
mean what the Congress which passed the first naturalization act in
1790 understood them to mean, and, no immigration being then
known except from England, Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Germany,
Sweden, France, and Holland, Congress must be taken to have
intended aliens coming from those countries only. The consequence
of this argument, viz., that Russians, Poles, Italians, Greeks, and
others, who had not theretofore immigrated, are to be excluded,
is ... absurd. 4
Second, even a modified version of the common-knowledge test using
the standards of the average, present-day man on the street would not
perform adequately. A typical man would use skin color and physical
features in order to determine a stranger's racial identity. However,
Ozawa55 and Thind56 rejected this methodology." Clearly, a skin-color test
51. Prejudice against the new immigrant groups from Europe found expression in the broader
social movements of the turn of the century. For example, proponents of Social Darwinism and
eugenics asserted the racial supremacy of Northern Europeans to Europeans of Slavic and
Mediterranean descent. See, e.g., Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt Necessities" v.
Fundamental Values?, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1418, 1427 (1981) (noting that "Eugenists took the
cultural characteristics which made assimilation difficult for eastern and southern European
immigrants and exaggerated them into innate biological deficiencies"). For examples of leading
works in the field of eugenics featuring theories relating to those of Slavic and Mediterranean
descent, see C. BRIGHAM, A STUDY OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE 192 (1923), quoted in Cynkar,
supra, at 1427, which noted that "[t]he intellectual superiority of our Nordic group over the
Alpine, Mediterranean, and negro groups has been demonstrated" as a scientific fact; and C.B.
DAVENPORT, HEREDITY IN RELATION TO EUGENICS 214 (1911), quoted in Cynkar, supra, at
1427, which argued that Germans were "full of courage and daring" but Italians lacked "self-
reliance, initiative, resourcefulness."
52. See, e.g., WATERS, supra note 48, at 2 (observing that, at the turn of the century, those of
Slavic and Mediterranean descent were viewed as a lower species of humanity, and certainly not
as members of the white race).
53. 180 F. 694 (2d Cir. 1910). Incidentally, the Balsara court rejected the common-
knowledge test in favor of the scientific-evidence inquiry. See id. at 695.
54. Id.
55. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 197 (1922).
56. United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 210 (1923).
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would not have done as a standard for racial determination of whiteness.
The United States had already granted white status and naturalization rights
to individuals with olive skin tones, such as Italians, Spaniards, and Slavs.
Thus, the Ozawa Court maintained that color alone could not be
determinative of whiteness. As the Court acknowledged, a skin-color test
"is impracticable as that differs greatly among persons of the same race,
even among Anglo-Saxons, ranging by imperceptible gradations from the
fair blond to the swarthy brunette, the latter being darker than many of the
lighter hued persons of the brown or yellow races." " Indeed, despite the
allegedly widespread embrace of the common-knowledge test in
jurisprudence leading up to and including Ozaiva and Thind, the common-
knowledge test never really triumphed. In fact, United States v. Dolla is
highly unusual in that it is the only racial-prerequisite case of the time to
actually use inspection of skin color as the primary criterion in rationalizing
whiteness.'
B. Performance as a Doctrinal Alternative: White Is as White Does
On one hand, Thind had explicitly rejected any further application of
the scientific-evidence inquiry. Nevertheless, neither Ozawa nor Thind had
provided a workable common-knowledge heuristic for the determination of
whiteness. Thus, this study proposes an alternative understanding of the
jurisprudence of Ozawa, Thind, and their progeny based on a dramaturgy of
whiteness. According to Theodore Allen, "By considering the notion of
'racial oppression' in terms of the substantive, the operative element,
namely 'oppression,' it is possible to avoid the contradictions and howling
absurdities that result from attempts to splice genetics and sociology [and to
learn] the peculiar function of the 'white race'... ."6t Behind the veil of
genetics-analyzed through the scientific-evidence inquiry-and the
facade of sociology-rationalized through the common-knowledge test-
there was a performance standard laid out in Ozawa and Thind that would
come to dominate racial-determination jurisprudence. Ultimately, racial
determination would be more than science or popular understanding
(whether in 1790 or 1920). Instead, it would come to provide an incentive
57. But see HANEY LPEz, supra note 15, at 107 (arguing that a popular, common-
knowledge understanding of racial determination was endorsed by the Supreme Court); Braman.
supra note 34, at 1410 (arguing that, starting with Ozawa and Thind the Supreme Court has
progressively moved toward an understanding of racial determination as contextual and socially
constructed).
58. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 197.
59. 177 F. 101 (5th Cir. 1910).
60. See HANEY L6pEz, supra note 15, at 206 n.c.
61. 1 THEODORE W. ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE: RACIAL OPPRESSION
AND SOCIAL CONTROL 28, 32 (1994).
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for an individual dramaturgy of whiteness and group assimilative behavior.
Performance thus became the measure of racial identity, particularly as a
tie-breaker in situations in which racial boundaries remained fluid and
blurry.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in both Ozawa and Thind contained
strong shades of individual performance, despite the Court's rejection of
both plaintiffs' petitions. Before examining the performative aspects of both
cases, however, it is instructive to lay out the theoretical basis for the
analysis. As this study argues, racial categories are largely the constructs of
society, situationally malleable, rigid at times, flexible at other times. As
such, racial determination has often been accomplished through the lens of
performance." This argument closely tracks Judith Butler's work on gender
in which she argues that we are what we pretend to be: Male is as male does
and female is as female does.63
Butler's theory of identity performance 64 is powerfully echoed in both
Ozawa and Thind.65 In Ozawa, the Court signposted Ozawa's educational
status, his religious beliefs, and his fluent use of the English language as
factors militating against its decision. As the Court irrelevantly remarked,
"He was a graduate of the Berkeley, California, High School, had been
nearly three years a student in the University of California, had educated his
children in American schools, his family had attended American churches
and he had maintained the use of the English language in his home." ' The
62. I am indebted to Abner Cohen's brilliant study on the Creoles of Sierra Leone for
inspiring the application of dramaturgy theory to law and social science research. See ABNER
COHEN, THE POLITICS OF ELITE CULTURE: EXPLORATIONS IN THE DRAMATURGY OF POWER IN A
MODERN AFRICAN SOCIETY (1981).
63. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTrIY
25 (1990). As Butler has argued, gender is a social construct promulgated through public drama.
By pointing to the gender performances of drag queens and cross-dressers. Butler has subverted
the notion of gender as a natural or fixed trait, demonstrating instead that gender is performative.
based on a collection of acts representing a mythic ideal. As Butler argues, "[Glender is always a
doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to preexist the deed .... There is no
gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the
very 'expressions' that are said to be its result." Id. Thus, to Butler, public embrace of gender
roles is, at its core, nothing more than a drag show.
64. As Butler argues, identity is formulated through four performative steps: (I)
differentiation of oneself from others; (2) pointing to paragons of one's chosen identity; (3)
development of practices to affirm one's chosen identity; and (4) repeated engagement in these
practices. See JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER at ix-xi (1993), cited in Camille A. Gear.
Note, The Ideology of Domination: Barriers to Client Autonomy in Legal Ethics Scholarship, 107
YALE L.J. 2473, 2484 (1998).
65. A number of legal scholars have drawn upon Butler's performativity analysis. See. e.g..
Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven. but Not Hell
Either, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1107, 1166 (1996) (using Butler's performance model to analyze
sexual orientation and gender identity); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual
Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 771 (1997) (using Butler's performance model to analyze
gender identity); see also Judith Butler, Burning Acts: Injurious Speech. 3 U. CHI. L. SC|l.
ROUNDTABLE 199, 199-204 (1996) (using the performance model to analyze hate speech).
66. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 189 (1922).
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Court considered Ozawa's embrace of Anglo-American culture, in the form
of his education, religion, and language of choice, as providing some proof
of performative whiteness. The Court also made sure to acknowledge group
assimilation in the form of the "culture and enlightenment of the Japanese
people." 67 Meanwhile. the Thind Court repeatedly referred to Thind's status
as a "high-class Hindu"'  as a countervailing factor in their decision.
Performative criteria took on great importance in both rulings. Indeed, the
Ozawa Court explicitly created a broad zone of potential whiteness,
whereby "[i]ndividual cases falling within this zone must be determined as
they arise from time to time by what this Court has called, in another
connection, 'the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. ' 61
Thus, the Supreme Court gave lower courts the ability to put the Anglo-
conformity of individuals and ethnic groups on trial.
C. Performance in the Construction of Whiteness: A Historical Tradition
It is important to note that the performative methodology for racial
determination set out in Ozawa and Thind did not emerge sua sponte.
Indeed, with its references to intrinsically non-racial characteristics such as
education, class, religion, language, and enlightenment, the Ozaiva and
Thind Courts invoked a semiology of whiteness and a performance model
for racial determination with a longstanding tradition in the United States.
The origins of the black/white color dichotomy itself help to illustrate the
point that American notions of race have long grounded themselves in
performative, rather than in scientific or naturalistic, criteria.
Contrary to the assumptions of some primordialist scholars,7" black and
white were not fixed and natural categories when the first Africans arrived
on American shores. As Haney L6pez correctly points out, "[T]he legal
liabilities that would significantly define the relative identity of Whites and
Blacks in North America were not in place in 1619."7' Legal developments
would play an instrumental role in constructing racial identities and
formalizing perceived differences in the following centuries. However,
Haney L6pez fails to note that the white/black color dichotomy did not even
exist in the early seventeenth century. The Africans brought to the
67. Id at 198.
68. United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204,206 (1923).
69. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 198 (quoting Davidson v. New Orleans. 96 U.S. 97. 104 (1877)).
70. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 6 (lst ed. 1973)
(asserting that color-based racial categories were rigid and fixed during the colonial years); A.
LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROCESS 19-22 (1978) (arguing that servitude and slavery moved from a non-racial to a racial
basis during the colonial years but not recognizing that racial concepts themselves were
constructed, moving from a basis in religious views to a basis in skin color).
71. HANEYL6PEZ, supra note 15, at 12.
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American colonies in those years were distinguished from Europeans
principally on the basis of religion, not color. Instead of a bifurcation
between white and black to define the Self and the Other,72 the English
called themselves "Christians" while referring to the Others-the
Africans-as "heathens." 73 Indeed, blacks and non-English servants of
European descent were often vested with a similar legal status, the key line
of demarcation being one of religion, not race or color.74
The report from the first race case in the Americas, Re Davis,75
illustrates this point. In the decision, the defendant received punishment for
engaging in sexual relations with a nameless individual of African descent.
The complete report reads: "Hugh Davis is to be soundly whipt before an
assembly of negroes & others for abusing himself to the dishonor of God
and shame of Christianity by defiling his body in lying with a negro which
fault he is to actk Next sabbath day."' 76 As the language of the report
demonstrates, Davis's crime was one against his Christianity; it was defined
primarily on religious, not chromatic, grounds. Moreover, the court makes
no mention of hierarchy based on differences in skin tones. Instead, the
most relevant division between Davis and the unnamed individual is one of
religious faith.
In fact, it was only after 1680, when the first major slave codes went
into effect in the American colonies,77 that the new white/black dichotomy
emerged. Two factors account for the emergence of a divide based on skin
color rather than on religion. First, some blacks had converted to
Christianity in an attempt to use baptism as an instrumental means to escape
bondage. Second, as slavery grew increasingly national in scope, society
needed a more visible and external system than internal religious beliefs for
the purposes of differentiation.78 As F.G. Bailey argues, color provides the
72. Constructivist theorists of identity formation utilize the taxonomy of the Self and the
Other to illustrate a common binary that results in hierarchical systems of differentiation. Typical
dividing lines for the differentiation include ethnicity, see FREDERICK BARTH, ETHNIC GROUPS
AND BOUNDARIES: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF CULTURE DIFFERENCE 9 (1969); Joane
Nagel, The Political Construction of Ethnicity, in COMPETITIVE ETHNIC RELATIONS 93 (Susan
Olzak & Joane Nagel eds., 1986), and gender, see JACQUES LACAN, FEMININE SEXUALITY (Juliet
Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose eds. & Jacqueline Rose trans., 1985) (arguing that men need to create
the concept of "woman"-a dialectic "other" or a petit objet ii-as a response to their existential
emptiness, insecurity, and lack of psychological completion); see also SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR.
THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., Bantam Books 1961) (1949); LUCE IRIGARAY,
THIS SEX WHICH IS NOT ONE (Catherine Porter trans., Cornell University Press 1985).
73. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 43 (1985).
74. See Harris, supra note 10, at 1717 n.20; see also Raymond T. Diamond & Robert J.
Cottrol, Codifying Caste: Louisiana's Racial Classification Scheme and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 29 LOY. L. REV. 255, 259 n.19 (1983).
75. 1 Mcllwaine 479 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1630), reprinted in HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 70, at 23.
76. Id.
77. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 70, at 38.
78. As Erving Goffman argues, when the signifier of identity is not a visible stigma,
individuals can better control information about themselves in order to avert discrimination. See
ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 48 (1963).
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necessary legibility to enforce hierarchies over a large territory. 9 The
principal criteria for distinguishing the English from the Africans
transformed from mutable religious affiliations to immutable differences in
skin color. A number of states even passed statutes preventing blacks from
escaping slavery through conversion to Christianity.8m Thus, the law limited
subversion of the racial hierarchy by constraining the social mobility of
blacks.8
Since conversion was no longer an option for escape, many mulattoes
resorted to litigation over their ancestry in order to escape the shackles of
slavery. With the skin color criterion firmly in place, the legal system was
obliged to hear their cases.' Nevertheless, practicing Christianity remained
a viable means of performing whiteness, with a long history of recognition
in American culture and courts. Similar embrace of other Western
European traditions has also served as a proxy for determination of racial
belonging. Racial-determination cases of the antebellum South, for
example, often turned upon the ability of a petitioner to perform white
womanhood or manhood through the embrace of Southern notions of virtue
and honor--concepts deeply engrained in the region's religious code.
Besides the key role of performative criteria in constructing the
black/white divide, the Ozawa and Thind Courts also drew upon the work
of earlier legal scholars who had utilized performative criteria in the
determination of racial grouping. For example, John Wigmore, one of the
leading evidence experts and treatise scribes of the nineteenth century,
wrote an 1894 article in which he contended that the Japanese were indeed
white.' Although his claim ostensibly rested upon the "scientific use of
language and... [upon] modem anthropology," 85 assimilationist criteria
formed the crux of his case. While he would have denied white
classification to all other Asiatic peoples, Wigmore embraced Japanese
whiteness on the grounds that the Japanese have "greater affinities with us
79. See F.G. BAILEY, POLITICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE: ORISSA IN 1959, at 126 (1963); F.G.
Bailey, Closed Social Stratification in Indian Society, 4 EUR. J. SOC. 107. 113, 120 (1963).
80. See, e.g., HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 70, at 36-37 (citing a 1667 Virginia statute
providing that "[wihereas some doubts have arisen whether children that are slaves by birth, and
by the charity and pity of their owners made partakers of the blessed sacrament of baptism, should
by virtue of their baptism be made free, it is enacted that baptism does not alter the condition of
the person as to his bondage offreedom" (emphasis added by Higginbotham)); id. at 200 (citing a
South Carolina statute passed in 1690 that declared that "no slave shall be free by becoming a
christian").
81. See WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATrITUDES TOWARD THE
NEGRO, 1550-1812, at 91-98 (1968).
82. See KENNET*H M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-
BELLUM SOUTH 195-96 (1956); Gross, supra note 35.
83. See Gross, supra note 35, at 156-76.
84. See John H. Wigmore, American Naturalization and the Japanese, 28 AM. L REV. 818
(1894).
85. Id at 827.
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in culture and progress and facility of social amalgamation than they have
with any Asiatic people." 86 Traits such as social assimilation and the ability
to contribute to progress have no relevance to an intrinsic and biological
conception of race. But they do provide a performative criteria for the
purposes of racial determination. Like Wigmore, the Supreme Court mixed
race with class, religion, educational attainment, and linguistic choice in
both Ozawa and Thind. In doing so, the Court effectively rejected any
intrinsic and biological notion of race in favor of a constructed one. Since
the common-knowledge test put forth by the Court was impractical in its
application, performance became the basis for racial construction in the
post-Thind era.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S PROGENY: PERFORMANCE THEORY,
WHITE DRAMATURGY, AND GROUP ASSIMILATION
All told, Ozawa and Thind transformed racial-determination
jurisprudence into a semiotic exercise, with judges attempting to decipher
the hieroglyphics of racial identity.87 Much like Irish immigrants, who half
a century before had transformed themselves from an oppressed, nonwhite
race in Ireland to oppressing members of the white race in the United
States," petitioning individuals in the racial-prerequisite cases succumbed
to dominant theories of racial supremacy in their litigation strategies by
attempting to distinguish themselves from their darker cousins. The
semiotics of performance dictated a need to act more "white" than whites.
Under the panopticonian gaze of the law, 9 the litigants had to perform
86. Id.
87. Analyzing the courts' opinions as narratives, one could argue that the judges' pursuit of
the hieroglyphics of racial identity resembles an exercise akin to that of such semiotic sleuths as
Oedipa Maas, see THOMAS PYNCHON, THE CRYING OF LOT 49 (1966), Arthur Gordon Pym. see
EDGAR ALLAN POE, THE NARRATIVE OF ARTHUR GORDON PYM OF NANTUCKET (J. Gerald
Kennedy ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1838), and Quinn, see PAUL AUSTER, CITY OF GLASS
(1985).
88. See generally IGNATIEV, supra note 46. Noel Ignatiev's intriguing study provides a
telling example of the complex system of symbols used by Irish Americans in the performance of
whiteness. Ignatiev examines how the Irish transformed themselves from an oppressed nice in
Ireland to an oppressing race in the United States-from being part of the Other to being a part of
the dominant race. See id. at 2. A key step in this process of transformation came with the
hypervigilance of the Irish in the anti-black movement. Unadulterated embrace of white
supremacy paved the way for Irish integration into the White Republic, see SAXTON, supra note
23, where citizenship was defined by race. Performance even yielded to over-performance, with
the Irish becoming more white than whites. "To become white [Irish immigrants] had to learn to
subordinate county, religious, or national animosities, not to mention any natural sympathies they
may have felt for their fellow creatures, to a new solidarity based on color-a bond which, it must
be remembered, was contradicted by their experience in Ireland." IGNATIEV, supra note 46. at 96.
89. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1978); see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, The Eye of
Power, in POWERIKNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS. 1972-1977, lit
146, 155 (Colin Gordon ed. & trans., Pantheon Books 1980) (arguing that the heightened
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whiteness, giving up other values and other facets of their identity. An
examination of the cases after Thind and Ozawa reveals the triumph of a
performative jurisprudence.'
A. Performing Whiteness: The Case of Armenians
United States v. Cartozian,9" one of the first racial-prerequisite cases
decided after Ozawa and Thind, is an excellent illustration of the
performative aspects of whiteness analyzed by courts and of the ways in
which courts interpreted Ozawa and Thind as precedent. As Cartozian
suggests, there was more than a clash between scientific and common-
knowledge doctrines at work in the jurisprudence of the era. Rather, the
ability of individuals to perform whiteness, regardless of their scientific
classification or ability to pass the common-knowledge test, became a
critical part of the determination of who was white enough to earn the
privilege of naturalization. In so ruling, Cartozian reads Thind as dictating a
court-directed dramaturgy of whiteness, not a common-knowledge test
delving into the statutory intent of the framers of the 1790 naturalization
laws.92
legibility of the Panopticon is a remarkably effective and efficient means of exercising control
over individuals, for "[t]here is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a
gaze. An inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by interiorising
to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercizing this surveillance over, and
against, himself. A superb formula: power exercised continuously and for what turns out to be
minimal cost").
90. For the sake of brevity, I have chosen to focus only on a few of the more interesting, yet
still representative, racial-prerequisite cases in the post-Ozawaf7hind era. Eleven additional cases
not discussed in this study occurred between 1923 and 1952. Like the cases discussed here. these
other cases drew upon the precedent of Ozawa and Thind. Where individuals remained outside of
the realm of racial ambiguity, see supra text accompanying note 69. the courts declared
individuals ineligible for naturalization by binding legal precedent. See, e.g.. Samras v. United
States, 125 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1942) (finding that Asian Indians are not white); De La Ysla v.
United States, 77 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1935) (finding that Filipinos are not white); United States v.
Gokhale, 26 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1928) (per curiam) (finding, in a case involving an Asian Indian.
that Hindus are not white); United States v. Javier, 22 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1927) (finding that
Filipinos are not white); In re Cruz, 23 F. Supp. 774 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) (finding that people of
three-quarters Native American and one-quarter African blood do not qualify as being of African
descent for the purposes of the naturalization statute); In re Fisher. 21 F.2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1927)
(finding that people who are three-quarters Chinese and one-quarter Portuguese are not white);
United States v. Mozumdar, 296 F. 173 (S.D. Cal. 1923) (finding, in a case involving an Asian
Indian, that Hindus are not white); Sato v. Hall, 217 P. 520 (Cal. 1923) (finding that Japanese are
not white); De Cano v. State, 110 P.2d 627 (Wash. 1941) (en banc) (finding that Filipinos are not
white). Meanwhile, the courts used performative criteria wherever they possessed discretion and
leeway in the act of racial determination. See, e.g., In re Din, 27 F.2d 568 (N.D. Cal. 1928)
(finding that Afghanis are not white); United States v. Ali, 7 F.2d 728 (E.D. Mich. 1925) (finding
that Punjabis, whether Hindu or Arab, are not white).
91. 6 F.2d919 (D. Or. 1925).
92. Thus, like the juries on race trials in the antebellum South. see Gross, supra note 35, at
117, 156-76, judges turned to a performative test for whiteness.
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In a move that epitomizes the court's rejection of both the scientific
inquiry and the common-knowledge test, Cartozian carefully distinguishes
Armenians from other ethnic groups of the Near East. Under the scientific-
evidence doctrine, all of the people of the Near East would technically
qualify as Caucasian, and would therefore count as white persons eligible
for naturalization. However, the court steers away from this view,
distinguishing Armenians from such ethnic groups as Arabs, Turks, and
Kurds.93
At the same time, the court fails to apply the common-knowledge test
as purportedly set forth in Ozawa and Thind. Indeed, the court's divide
between Armenians and other inhabitants of Asia Minor has little to do with
how a common man of the street would view an Armenian vis-A-vis an
Arab, Turk, or Kurd. After all, the court even admits that the Armenian
province is within the confines of Turkey, which was classified by the
common man and woman on the street at the time as an Asiatic society.94
Moreover, the court never claims that a common person on the street,
whether from 1790 or 1925, could distinguish an Armenian from an Arab,
Turk, or Kurd. Nevertheless, the court draws a clear line between its
treatment of Armenians and its potential treatment of other inhabitants of
Asia Minor.
Instead, it is performance of whiteness and perceived assimilatory
capacity that plays the critical role in the court's decision. Specifically, the
Cartozian court uses Armenian group assimilation as a proxy for individual
dramaturgy to determine the performative worthiness of Tatos 0. Cartozian
for citizenship. First, in the spirit of Ozawa and Thind, the court conflates
the issue of religion with race, inextricably linking racial belonging with the
ability of a group to utilize a fundamental tool for integration into the White
Republic. As the court writes,
Although the Armenian province is within the confines of the
Turkish Empire, being in Asia Minor, the people thereof have
always held themselves aloof from the Turks, the Kurds, and allied
peoples, principally, it might be said, on account of their religion,
though color may have had something to do with it. The
Armenians, tradition has it, very early, about the fourth century,
espoused the Christian religion, and have ever since consistently
adhered to their belief, and practiced it.95
With these words, the court shifts seamlessly from an alleged
discussion of race to a discussion of religion. Whether the Armenians have
93. See Cartozian, 6 F.2d at 920.
94. See Trucios-Gaynes, supra note 39, at 406.
95. Cartozian, 6 F.2d at 920.
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historically practiced Christianity is of no relevance whatsoever to any
primordial or naturalistic view of racial grouping. Similarly, it is not
discoverable to the common man on the street. Nevertheless, the court is
constructing race as dramaturgy with religion as a primary component in
the semiotics of division. For Armenians, Christianity, instead of color,
becomes a proxy for racial belonging.
Such a move by the court is not without precedent. As noted earlier,"
both Ozawa and Thind contained heavy shades of performative criteria.
Furthermore, the use of religion as a prime mover in the creation of racial
divisions is a critical, but frequently overlooked, tradition in American
history. Not yet fixed within society's rigid racial categorizations,
Armenians could point to their religious affiliation as performative proof of
their whiteness.
As Cartozian demonstrates, religious affiliation is an important part of
the racial determination of Armenians, for the embrace of Christianity
enables Armenians to assimilate into mainstream Anglo-Saxon culture.
"[I]t may be confidently affirmed that the Armenians are white persons,
and moreover that they readily amalgamate with the European and white
races,"' the court argues. Such language is significant since it draws
directly from the ruling in Thind, in which the Supreme Court denied
citizenship to Thind on the grounds of assimilability. "The children of
English, French, German, Italian, Scandinavian, and other European
parentage," the Thind Court noted, "quickly merge into the mass of our
population and lose the distinctive hallmarks of their European origin. On
the other hand, it cannot be doubted that the children born in this country of
Hindu parents would retain indefinitely the clear evidence of their
ancestry."98 The implication of the Supreme Court's words is clear:. Thind
and his children did not possess sufficient performative capacity to act
white. Thind may have been an upper-class Indian, but he was still a Hindu.
Armenians, by contrast, were Christians, not "heathens," as the ancient
dichotomy would dictate. On top of that, they fell into a sector of the
American racial typology sufficiently fraught with ambiguity that they
could rely heavily on performative criteria in order to convince the courts
that they lay on the white side of the racial divide.
Performance of whiteness was not limited to religious belief. The
Cartozian court also conflates class with race through the comical use of
anecdote and the selective application of demographic evidence. In its
ruling, the court cites the work of Dr. Paul Rohrbach, "a scholar of note"
who recounts tales of an "Armenian who became a count in Russia,
96. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
97. Cartozian, 6 F.2d at 920.
98. United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204,215 (1923).
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marrying a Russian countess or baroness, and an Armenian missionary who
married a German baroness." 99 With these words, performance of
aristocracy and membership in the ruling class is made synonymous with
whiteness. The court's syllogistic logic is irrepressible: Armenians had
freely mingled with the ruling class of Europe, and all members of the
European ruling class must be white; therefore, Armenians had to be white.
Here, the court moves beyond racial elements to evidence of class that has
no relevance to a scientific conception of race or even one based on
common knowledge.'0° Instead, it is performance directed toward the bench
that matters.
The court also points to the evidence from another expert witness,
Dr. Barton, who provides the ultimate evidence of white performance-
assimilation through marriage-by Armenians. Dr. Barton's anecdotal
evidence has nothing to do with any naturalistic formulation of race.
"Within his own information," declares the court without any sense of
irony, Dr. Barton "knows of ten or fifteen Armenians in Boston who have
married American wives." 101
Meanwhile, the court's analysis is riddled with the kind of scientific
analysis that Ozawa and Thind supposedly did away with. The language of
science is employed throughout the court's analysis. The majority opinion
makes sure to mention that both key witnesses it relies upon are doctors.
Furthermore, the court attempts to bestow scientific legitimacy upon its
opinion by resorting to demographic studies rife with purportedly relevant
statistical findings. To this effect, the court cites a survey of immigrant
intermarriage in New York City that found that first-generation Armenians
possessed a similar rate of marriage with individuals outside of their
nationality (9.63%) as other immigrants.'0° From this study, the court
endorses the conclusion that there was "no discrimination respecting the
intermarriage of men and women of Armenian blood with native
Americans; nor has she found that the question of color or race enters as an
obstacle." 103 The court's message to new immigrant groups is clear: If you
can assimilate yourself into the White Republic, you will gain the privileges
of whiteness. Whiteness is not a given, naturally determined, exogenous
variable in the equation. Instead, it is an outcome, a reward dependent on
performance and assimilation.
99. Cartozian, 6 F.2d at 921.
100. Ironically, the court is in fact drawing upon expert evidence and the behavior of the
aristocracy to determine what common people on the street know of racial divides.
101. Cartozian, 6 F.2d at 921.
102. See id. at 921-22.
103. Id. at 922.
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B. Is White, Is Not White: The Case of Arabs'o
Two cases within a two-year span, l re Hassan 5 and Fx parte
Mohriez,'06 addressed whether Arabs qualified as white persons for
naturalization purposes. Despite the issuance of contrary rulings, the
methodology of both courts was the same, interpreting Thind, Ozawa, and
their progeny as dictating performative criteria in the matter of racial
determination. Hence, the cases represented two sides of the same coin and
followed the dramaturgic trend of racial jurisprudence. Indeed, the two
cases powerfully demonstrate how the racial-prerequisite cases ultimately
featured racial judgments made from, and performances directed toward,
the bench.
In 1942, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan held that an Arab male, Ahmed Hassan, did not qualify as a white
person capable of citizenship through naturalization."( Concerns over
assimilation and religious difference provide the court with its justification.
As Judge Tuttle writes,
Apart from the dark skin of the Arabs, it is well known that they are
a part of the Mohammedan world and that a wide gulf separates
their culture from that of the predominately Christian peoples of
Europe. It cannot be expected that as a class they would readily
intermarry with our population and be assimilated into our
civilization."
Thus, in the spirit of Cartozian,09 religion once again becomes a proxy
for race. The court adopts the performative interpretation of Thind, as
epitomized by Cartozian, as controlling. Furthermore, in distinguishing the
result of Cartozian from the case at bar, Judge Tuttle remarks that
Armenians were a
Christian people living in an area close to the European border,
who have intermingled and intermarried with Europeans over a
period of centuries. Evidence was also presented in that case of a
considerable amount of intermarriage of Armenian immigrants to
the United States with other racial strains in our population."'
104. With thanks to SOUL COUGHING. Is Chicago. Is Not Chicago, on RUBY VROOM1
(WEAIWarner Bros. 1994).
105. 48 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Mich. 1942).
106. 54 F. Supp. 941 (D. Mass. 1944).
107. See Hassan, 48 F. Supp. at 845.
108. Id.
109. See supra text accompanying note 95.
110. Hassan, 48 F. Supp. at 846.
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Therefore, the court bases its ruling not on any scientific notion of race,
which would equate Armenians with Arabs, or on any common-knowledge
test, but on the performance of whiteness through religious practices and
intermarriage.
Only two years later, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts held that an Arab man, Mohamed Mohriez, did in fact
qualify as a free white person capable of obtaining citizenship through
naturalization."' In following the precedent of Thind as interpreted by
subsequent courts, the court delved into a performance-based analysis.
While the court kept its focus on Arabs as a class, rather than on Mohamed
Mohriez as a person, the emphasis was still distinctly performative.
In its short opinion, the court highlights the close link between the Arab
people and the West:
The names of Avicenna and Averroes, the sciences of algebra and
medicine, the population and the architecture of Spain and of
Sicily, the very words of the English language, remind us as they
would have reminded the Founding Fathers of the action and
interaction of Arabic and non-Arabic elements of our culture." 
2
Through its cultural-affinity analysis, the court follows its predecessors in
equating scientific achievement, cultural sophistication, and the very notion
of civilization with whiteness. This represents a far cry from the
disingenuous claims of the Thind Court that disavowed any espousal of
racial hierarchy. 13 Furthermore, the court highlights the role of the Arab
people as one of the chief vessels through which the ancient Greek tradition
has lasted to the modern era." '4 Once again, the court's racial calculus is
highly performative: To act as a channel for whiteness, to have whiteness
flow through the veins of the culture, is to perform whiteness and therefore
to constitute whiteness.
Despite Judge Wyzansky's adoption of performative criteria in the act
of racial determination, his opinion in Mohriez stands alone among the
racial-prerequisite cases in challenging the fundamental constitutionality of
the naturalization laws. Indeed, Wyzansky questions the consistency of the
white-only naturalization law with the supposed principles of the American
democracy. Carefully treading between the line of carrying out the law and
legislating it, he writes:
And finally it may not be out of place to say that, as is shown by
our recent changes in the laws respecting persons of Chinese
111. See Mohriez, 54 F. Supp. at 942.
112. Id. (citations omitted).
113. See supra note 36.
114. See Mohriez, 54 F. Supp. at 942.
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nationality and of the yellow race, we as a country have learned
that policies of rigid exclusion are not only false to our professions
of democratic liberalism but repugnant to our vital interests as a
world power. In so far as the Nationality Act of 1940 is still open to
interpretation, it is highly desirable that it should be
interpreted... so as to fulfill the promise that we shall treat all men
as created equal." 5
This critique of the naturalization laws calls into question the immunity
of immigration laws from many constitutional safeguards-a judicial view
still in force to this very day. ' 6 Though courts have consistently held that
the Constitution grants Congress a special plenary power over immigration
policies,"1 7 Wyzansky's words provide a stern warning that certain policies
can cross the line and are fundamentally repugnant to the very democratic
ideals that the Constitution intends to promote. Moreover, these policies can
lead to arbitrary lawmaking. As the prerequisite cases reveal, policies that
rely upon racial determination are particularly dangerous, for they seek to
reify that which is socially constructed, fluid and shifting."' As a result,
racial-determination games often produce judicial opinions riddled with
internal contradictions and dadaistic logic that find Arabs to qualify as
white in some situations and nonwhite in others. All told, the body of
racial-prerequisite jurisprudence suggests that the courts should get out of
the determination business altogether." 9
C. The Perfornance Tie-Breaker
Prior to Thind, performance played a role in racial determination as a
tie-breaker of sorts. For example, in In re Balsara,' a United States district
115. Id. at943.
116. See Trucios-Gaynes, supra note 39, at 374.
117. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155. 201 (1993); Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972).
118. In order to make subjects visible to their gaze, hegemons frequently ground their
power/knowledge systems in identity signifiers, such as a person's race or appellation. The
effectiveness of such signifiers as a tool for legibility naturally depends upon their immutable
quality. When such signifiers turn out to be fluid, socially-constructed, and malleable through
time and space, the carefully constructed edifice around such signifiers loses its value. The result
has been the failure of many schemes intended to improve the human condition. See JAMES C.
ScoTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN ScHEMEs To IMPROVE THE HUMAN CoNDIoTIN
HAvE FAMED (1998); John Tehranian & James C. Scott, The Production of Legal Identities
Proper to States: The Case of the Permanent Family Surname (unpublished manuscript, on file
with The Yale Law Journal).
119. By maling judicial opinions read like Tristan Tzara's Dadaist Manifesto, see TRISTAN
TzARA, Dadaist Manifesto, in SEvEN DADA MANIFESTOS AND LAMPtsTERtES (Barbara Wright
trans., Calder 1977) (1919), such racial-determination games ultimately undermine the credibility
of the rule of law and the alleged reliance of jurisprudence on rationality and logic.
120. 171 F. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1909), af'd sub nonL United States v. Balsara. 180 F. 694 (2d Cir.
1910).
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court held that a Parsee was a white person for the purposes of
naturalization. As Ian Haney L6pez remarks, "Despite concluding that
Asian Indians probably were not White, the court noted the need for an
authoritative pronouncement on this issue, as well as the government's
willingness to appeal. For these reasons, the court ruled that Balsara could
naturalize." 121 But Haney L6pez is only partially correct. As the court's
concluding words reveal, performative criteria influenced the decision.
"[S]ince the applicant appear[ed] to be a gentleman of high character and
exceptional intelligence," 122 the court elected to grant the petition for
naturalization to Balsara. Thus, the court utilized performance as a tie-
breaker in a borderline case.
In Ozawa, Thind, and their progeny, the use of performative criteria
continued, with courts invoking a dramaturgy of whiteness as a tie-breaker
in close questions about race. In United States v. Pandit," decided three
years after Thind, certain critical facts about Sakharam Ganesh Pandit, an
Indian immigrant to the United States, played a vital role in the trial court's
declaration of Pandit's whiteness. Such details were also important enough
to the Ninth Circuit that the court emphasized them in its brief statement of
the facts. This information included repeated references to Sakharam
Ganesh Pandit's Brahman caste and high social standing, detailed
descriptions of his impressive wealth, an extensive r6sum6 of his
educational training, and a passing, but all too significant, reference to his
marriage to a white woman. 24
In 1939, Wadia v. United States2 5 overturned Balsara in light of the
Supreme Court's decisions in Ozawa and Thind. Nevertheless, the court
still used performative criteria in making its decision. Indeed, Judge
Augustus Hand made sure to signpost Wadia's Zoroastrian religion at one
point in the brief opinion. 26 While the court ruled that Parsees cannot
qualify as white people since they are too closely associated with the
nonwhite Hindus, it still quoted passages from both Thind and Ozawa that
dictated the use of assimilationist criteria in racial determination and the
availability of performative outlets. The court first cited a passage from
Thind that provided a possible escape for even those of "primarily Asiatic
stock" to be considered white.127 The court then referred to Ozawa as
121. HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 15, at 206 app. a n.a.
122. Balsara, 171 F. at 295.
123. 15 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1926).
124. See id. at 285.
125. 101 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1939).
126. See id. at 7.
127. Id. at 8 (citing United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 214 (1923)). Admittedly. the Thind
Court does go on to declare that "there is much in the origin and historic development of the




stating that there were "some Asiatics whose long contiguity to European
nations and assimilation with their culture has caused them to be thought of
as of the same general characteristics." 12 While Parsecs, with their
allegedly inextricable link to the Hindu people, could not make the
whiteness cut, the court left open the door for other ethnic groups finding
themselves caught between two racial groupings. The court's message was
clear: White performance would still be rewarded with white privilege."
IV. WHITE PERFORMANCE, RACIAL DETERMINATION, AND THE
LAW TODAY
A. Modem Immigration Laws: Rewarding Perfornance with Privilege
In the area of immigration and naturalization law, we have come a long
way from the racial-prerequisite cases of the first half of the century. With
the McCarran-Walter (Immigration and Nationality) Act of 1952, Congress
finally abandoned the race-based system of naturalization in existence since
1790.130 After 1952, members of any ethnicity and race could become
citizens; yet the quota system based on national origins, which limited
annual immigration from each nationality to two percent of the respective
nationality's share of the United States population in 1890, remained intact.
It was not until 1965 that Congress finally did away with the quota
system-a system that placed heavy restrictions on immigrants from
anywhere in the world besides Western Europe.3
However, despite these reforms, a performative/white bias continues to
exist in the immigration system. First of all, the new system's per-country
allocations continue to limit immigration from historically excluded
countries,132 effectively limiting immigration by individuals of certain
nonwhite races. More importantly, the recent debate over immigration
reform has called for greater assimilation of immigrant groups into the
United States. For example, the final report of the Commission on
128. Wadia, 101 F.2d at 9 (citing Ozawa v. United States. 260 U.S. 178. 198 (1922)).
129. This sentiment was strongly echoed in the Supreme Court's Korematsu case. As Justice
Murphy's dissent in the case argues, outright racism and the failure of Japanese immigrants to
assimilate themselves into the White Republic (unlike German and Italian immigrants) played a
vital role in the military's decision to single them out for internment and the Supreme Court's
decision to declare the military's actions constitutional. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 236-40 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). Thus, white performance by both German and Italian
Americans was rewarded with protection from internment and the failure of Japanese Americans
to assimilate was punished. I want to thank Kenneth Stahl for pointing out the link to Koreniatsu.
130. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. ch. 2. § 311. 66 Stat. 163. 239 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1994)).
131. See Trucios-Gaynes, supra note 39, at 399.
132. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New
Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REv. 273. 298 (1996).
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Immigration Reform in 1997 called for the "Americanization" of new
immigrants through a "process of integration by which immigrants become
part of our communities and by which our communities and the nation learn
from and adapt to their presence." 13 In particular, the report emphasized
the importance of these new immigrant groups to conform to white,
Christian, Western European norms, especially in their adoption of English
as their primary language. Here, the old quid pro quo present in the racial-
prerequisite cases of the early half of the century is repeated: If you can
assimilate yourself into the White Republic, you will gain the privileges of
whiteness. Without white performance, immigration reform would be
necessary and privileges would be revoked from these minority groups. The
rhetoric of isolationists and other advocates of tighter borders has even
made this quid pro quo explicit. White performance is still a condition of
white privilege."3
B. Race and the Constitution: Cases Under § 1981 and § 1982
From the development of the black/white dichotomy in the colonial
years and the whiteness trials of the antebellum South to the racial-
prerequisite trials of the first half of the twentieth century, American courts
have enforced racial divides on the basis of performance. This points to an
unoriginal, but critical, observation about the very notion of race: It is
nothing more than a social construct, situationally dependent, open to
manipulation, and thoroughly unnatural. Yet despite this observation, the
reality of racial construction continues to be ignored in American
jurisprudence today-with harmful consequences.
The doctrines found in the racial-prerequisite cases are not merely a
curiosity of our past. Rather, they continue to resonate in the law today in
the form of racial-definition games. Courts (and legislatures) continue to
put themselves, in a position where they must determine racial
categorizations in order to determine the outcomes of lawsuits. As the
prerequisite cases earlier this century demonstrate, such a venture into
racial determination is dangerous, for the ambiguous notion of race often
leaves courts free to fiddle with cases to achieve unjust ends. This potential
for danger has been realized in a number of suits brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 and § 1982.
133. U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION
AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 26 (1997).
134. It is critical to note that white performance is not the only form of racial dramaturgy.
Where nonwhite groups dominate, performance of nonwhiteness can be a condition for nonwhite
privilege. For example, Italian-American teenagers in the inner-city frequently perform
nonwhiteness to distance themselves from the white hegemon and to facilitate their assimilation
with other urban youth.
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To begin with, the racial-prerequisite cases of the past bear great
relevance to modem civil rights actions; Thind, Ozawa, and their progeny
raise a number of critical philosophical questions in relation to § 1981 and
§ 1982 actions. For example, can Caucasians sue under § 1981 and § 1982
for racial discrimination? Should it matter what race someone belongs to in
order to maintain a § 1981 or § 1982 action when race is a social construct
in the first place? Why continue to use white citizens as the standard by
which to measure economic, political, and social rights under § 1981 and
§ 1982 when the definition of white continues to cause innumerable
problems? The answer to these questions has profound implications for
states like Hawai'i, where control of socioeconomic resources increasingly
lies in the hands of a nonwhite majority, and American society more
generally as we continue to grow more heterogeneous in ethnic
composition. Furthermore, it remains disputed whether individuals of
Caucasian descent such as Arabs, Jews, and Indians, who may still face
racially based discrimination, can sue under § 1981 and § 1982. The cases
addressing these issues reveal how courts continue to avoid recognition of
race as a social construction. Much like the racial-prerequisite cases of the
early half of the century, this ignorance has led to miscarriages of justice in
a number of cases.
Saint Francis College v. Al-KIazraji'35 appeared to settle the issue of
whether Arabs could qualify as a racial group capable of suing under 42
U.S.C. § 1981. In that case, the plaintiff, an Arab professor, was denied
tenure by Saint Francis College, allegedly on the basis of his racial
background. As a result, he filed a § 1981 action against the college.
Originating from the Civil Rights Act of 1866,' 36 § 1981 dictates that
[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens."'
As the Supreme Court held in Runyon v. McCrary," the section applies
to all racial discrimination in both private and public contracts. '39 Therefore,
Al-Khazraji claimed that the college's denial of tenure deprived him of the
contractual rights enjoyed by similarly positioned white citizens. In
response, the college contended that Al-Khazraji was Caucasian and
135. 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
136. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 3 1, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted as Act of May 31. 1870, ch. 114,
§ 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1994)).
137. 42U.S.C.§ 1981.
138. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
139. See i. at 168, 174-75.
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therefore not a member of a race different from the defendant's. As such, he
had no standing under § 1981. Although the district court held that "§ 1981
does not reach claims of discrimination based on Arabian ancestry," "4 the
Third Circuit reversed 4. and the Supreme Court affirmed the reversal,
holding that
a distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify for § 1981
protection. If respondent on remand can prove that he was
subjected to intentional discrimination based on the fact that he was
born an Arab, rather than solely on the place or nation of his origin,
or his religion, he will have made out a case under § 198 1. 42
Thus, Saint Francis College could not escape a § 1981 action on the
grounds that Al-Khazraji was technically Caucasian.
Only a few years later, however, Lockheed Missiles and Space
Company managed to get a § 1981 suit in California Superior Court
dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiff, an Indian male, was technically
Caucasian and could not sue his employers for denying him the rights of a
white citizen. 43 As the trial court held, "[B]y definition, [Sandhul is
Caucasian... [and] a person who is in fact Caucasian may not complain of
race." '44 Thus, the trial court accepted Lockheed's view that AI-Khazraji
actually acknowledged the familiar division of the human race into only
three groupings-Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid.' 45
Ultimately, the California Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the
case. However, the trial court's position shows the continuing danger of the
courts' failure to recognize the reality of racial construction. Indeed, the
trial court's position in Sandhu provides a prime example of the
disingenuous use of the past as negative precedent. 46 By accepting the
tripartite racial division of human beings, the California trial court clashed
with the Thind Court's definition of whites (which excluded Indians). After
all, the trial court could claim that such a definition led to the unjust denial
of naturalization rights to Indian immigrants. However, such use of the past
140. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S at 606 (footnote omitted).
141. Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 784 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1986).
142. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 613.
143. See Sandhu v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 26 Cal. App. 4th 846, 850 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994).
144. Id. at 850 (quoting Judge Stone's unpublished opinion for the Superior Court of Santa
Clara County).
145. See id. at 851 (citing Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 610 n.4).
146. See Deborah A. Widiss, Note, Re-viewing History: The Use of the Past as Negative
Precedent in United States v. Virginia, 108 YALE L.J. 237 (1998). As Widiss notes, the tension
between stare decisis and evolution in the law is particularly salient "in a jurisprudence that
defines itself in counter-distinction to the past, yet works within a structure that embraces a
conservative adherence to past decisions as precedent." Id. at 238. Antidiscrimination law is a
prime example of one of these areas in the law.
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as negative precedent only furthered racial injustice in the Sandlu case.
When it was a matter of denying naturalization rights, courts found Indians
to be nonwhite; when it was a matter of denying relief for discrimination,
courts found Indians to be white. The instrumental construction of race was
at work in both Thind and Sandhu.
The failure to learn from the past and acknowledge the extent to which
race is a social construct almost led to an unjust result in Shaare Tefila
Congregation v. Cobb. 7 In that case, the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland dismissed charges against eight private defendants
for violations of federal law arising from the defendants' alleged
desecration of a congregation's synagogue.
One of the key issues in the case centered on whether the defendants'
alleged acts constituted racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982, for the defendants admittedly perceived Jews as a racially distinct
group. Section 1982 provides that "[a]ll citizens of the United States shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white
citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property." " The congregation averred that desecration of the
synagogue stemmed from racial prejudice and deprived them of the right to
hold real and personal property. 49 As both the district court and the Fourth
Circuit (in affirmnng the lower court) held, § 1982 was not meant to attach
to "situations in which a plaintiff is not a member of a racially distinct
group but is merely perceived to be so by defendants." ,' As Jews did not
constitute a racially distinct group, the court had to sustain the defendants'
12(b)(6) motion.
In their rulings, the two courts failed to recognize race as a social
construction, rather than as a scientific fact or an inherent element of human
existence. "Although we sympathize with appellant's position," the court
noted, "we conclude that it cannot support a claim of racial discrimination
solely on the basis of defendants' perception of Jews as being members of a
racially distinct group. To allow otherwise would permit charges of racial
discrimination to arise out of nothing more than the subjective, irrational
perceptions of defendants." ' Strangely, the court did not realize that all
discrimination suits arise from these senseless misperceptions; as the racial-
prerequisite cases have taught us, racial categories themselves are arbitrary
products of human will. The poignant words of Judge Wilkinson's partial
concurrence perfectly captured this critique of the majority view: "All
147. 606 F. Supp. 1504 (D. Md. 1985), aftid, 785 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1986). rev'd, 481 U.S.
615 (1987).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994).
149. See Shaare Tefila Congregation, 785 F.2d at 526.
150. Id; see also Shaare Tefila Congregation, 606 F. Supp. at 1504. 1508-09.
151. Shaare Tefila Congregation, 785 F.2d at 527.
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racial prejudice is the result of subjective, irrational perceptions, which
drain individuals of their dignity because of their perceived equivalence as
members of a racial group." 152
Although the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the Fourth Circuit, its
resolution of the case remained problematic: The Supreme Court itself
failed to establish an unambiguous test for § 1982 violations and chose to
ignore the lower courts' definition of race.1 53 Writing for the majority,
Justice White suggested that § 1982 did protect plaintiffs from intentional
discrimination solely because of their "ancestry or ethnic
characteristics." '- However, his opinion never explained how this phrase
could apply to Jews, who arguably constitute neither a distinct race nor an
ethnic group.'55 Furthermore, the Court made no mention of Judge
Wilkinson's subjective-perception test, which acknowledges race as a
social construction. Adoption of such a test-which reflects the reality of
racial categories-would "avoid[] the problem of defining ancestry or
ethnicity by expanding the scope of racial discrimination to include
subjective perceptions of groups as race. Jews would qualify under this test
regardless of their status as a religious group because Jewish people are
perceived as a race." 156 Instead, the Supreme Court stubbornly refused to
acknowledge race as a social construct. 157 In so doing, the Court left the
door open for it to continue to engage in games of racial determination that
can only place excessive discretion in the hands of judges and lead to
perversions of justice, whereby-for example-Indians are declared
nonwhite for the purpose of denying them citizenship, but declared white
for the purpose of denying them § 1981 relief when they face
discrimination.'58
152. Id. at 528 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153. See Joseph Avanzato, Note, Section 1982 and Discrimination Against Jews: Shaare
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 225 (1987) (arguing that the Fourth Circuit
decided the case incorrectly and that the Supreme Court's reversal of the lower court failed to
provide guidance for future § 1982 cases).
154. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615. 617 (1987) (quoting Saint Francis
College v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987)).
155. On a related note, questions abound on the definition of "Jewish." See, e.g., MERYL
HYMAN, "WHO IS A JEW'?" (1998); JACK WERTHEIMER, A PEOPLE DIVIDED: JUDAISM IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 173-80 (1993); Nancy Caren Richmond, Comment, Israel's Law of
Return: Analysis of Its Evolution and Present Application, 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 95 (1993).
156. Avanzato, supra note 153, at 255.
157. This assertion directly contradicts the thesis of Donald Braman's recent article, Of Race
and Immutability, which argues that the Supreme Court has consistently, at least since Ozawa and
Thind, moved toward a view of racial status as the product of social and political institutions, and
not of biology. See Braman, supra note 34. First, if this were the case, it would be difficult to
rationalize the results of Al-Khazraji in the district court and the court of appeals. Second,
Braman's article almost entirely ignores the Supreme Court's opinion in Shaare Tefila
Congregation, even though it was issued in conjunction with AI-Khazraji, a case that Braman
discusses extensively. See id. at 1442-45.
158. Similarly, courts accepted a broad definition of blackness to uphold social sanctions
such as segregation against African Americans, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541. 550
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V. CONCLUSION: MOVING BEYOND RACE
This study attempts to move race theory beyond the simple black/white
paradigm. Like most Americans, academics tend to focus exclusively on the
dichotomy between black and white and not on the broader racial issues in
our nation. While the black/white paradigm has played a profound role in
our nation's history, it does not address the myriad issues related to those
caught in blurry and gray portions of the divide, both in law and praxis,
such as those of Japanese, Chinese, and Indian descent. We have never
existed in a truly bipolar racial society, and academic scholarship is
increasingly recognizing this.
59
Furthermore, through an analysis of the racial-prerequisite cases after
1923, this study supports the view that race is a social construction. 60
Categories are situational. 6 ' They can alter over time. For example, the
notion of white has undergone a significant transformation in the United
States over the past two centuries. In the early years of the republic, white
referred to those of Anglo-Saxon or Teutonic descent. Thus, the Irish and
Italians were viewed as outside of the category. Over time, however, the
Irish and Italians became a part of a broadened, more flexible definition of
white. 62 Additionally, racial categories can alter over space. In modern-day
Hawai'i, for example, the term haole, universally used by locals to refer to
Caucasians, does not include those of Portuguese or Jewish descent.163
Performative criteria helped the racial-prerequisite cases construct their
own vision of whiteness.
The courts' problematic theory of race continues to plague recent
jurisprudence by threatening to deprive deserving individuals of protection
from discriminatory activity. But the impact of the courts' theories on race
is even more grave than this. According to Robert Gordon,
(1896) (upholding as reasonable the classification of an individual of" one-eighth African blood"
as black), but imposed a narrow definition of blackness to deny those of African blood the
privileges of African descent, see In re Cruz, 23 F. Supp. 774 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) (denying the right
to naturalization to an individual of one-quarter African blood on the grounds that he was not of
African descent).
159. See, e.g., Robert S. Chang, The Nativist's Dream of Return, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 55. 55
(1996); Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowernent: It's Not Just Black and White Anymore,
47 STAN. L. REV. 957, 960-69 (1995); William R. Tamayo. When the "Coloreds" Are Neither
Black nor Citizens: The United States Civil Rights Movement and Global Migration. 2 AStAN L.J.
1, 10-15 (1995); Trucios-Gaynes, supra note 39. at 373.
160. For other works demonstrating the fundamental flaws of a scientific/naturalistic view of
race, see MICHAEL BANTON & JONATHAN HARWOOD. THE RACE CONcEPT 43-60 (1975);
ASHLEY MONTAGU, STATEMENT ON RACE 46-50 (3d ed. 1972); Frank B. Livingstone, On the
Nonexistence of Human Race, in THE CONCEPT OF RACE 46. 46-59 (Ashley Montagu ed., 1964);
and Henry P. Lundsgaarde, Racial and Ethnic Classifications: An Appraisal of the Role of
Anthropology in the Lawmaking Process, 10 Hous. L. REv. 641.648-49 n.23 (1973).
161. See John Okamura, Situational Identity. 4 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 452 (1981).
162. See, e.g., supra notes 46 and 61.
163. See PAUL THEROUX, THE HAPPY ISLES OF OCEANIA 476 (1992).
2000]
The Yale Law Journal
[T]he power exerted by a legal regime consists less in the force that
it can bring to bear against violators of its rules than in its capacity
to persuade people that the world described in its images and
categories is the only attainable world in which a sane person
would want to live.164
As such, a major step in the dismantling of the racial stratification of our
nation will come from explicit recognition by the courts that race is a social
construction, not an inherent part of human existence or a scientific fact.
Only then will we be able to recognize racial division as nothing more than
a subjective and irrational perception that oppresses us all; only then will
our nation set out on the path towards equality for all of its people.
164. Gordon, supra note 22, at 109.
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